INTRODUCTION
IN HIS DISCUSSION on the Marshallian theory of barter, 2 Edgeworth had a precise formulation of barter processes for the simple two-good economy. 3 The process of barter dealt with by Marshall and Edgeworth consisted of successive bartering between individuals until the position was reached at which no barter was possible for each individual to become better off. Edgeworth graphically showed that the equilibrium reached by the process depended upon the path of bartering as well as the amount of goods initially held by each individual. The process of barter, therefore, constitutes a strong contrast to Walras's tatonnement process. 4 Walras's process is a provisional market process by which competitive equilibria are attained, and the equilibrium reached by it is determined solely by the initial holdings, independently of the path of the process. (It is customary in economic literature to say that a market process is determinate if the equilibrium reached by that process is determined only by the initial holdings.5) However, the markets, of which the tatonnement process represents the working of exchange, are restricted to those in which either Edgeworth's recontracting is permitted or Walras's device of bons is introduced. 6 In a recent work [8] , Hurwicz has attempted to formulate the process of barter in a more general model, and various optimality criteria have been discussed. However, the problem of whether or not the process of barter thus formulated actually reaches (or asymptotically approaches) equilibrium states has not been handled. The stability problem of adjustment processes in those markets in which transactions may take place during the process of adjustment has been handled by Hahn [7] and Negishi [11] . Hahn [7] has considered an adjustment process in which each individual has a positive excess demand whenever the aggregate demand exceeds the aggregate supply and has shown the stability of such a process under fairly general conditions. The barter process discussed by Negishi [11] , on the other hand, does not necessarily belong to such a restricted class as the one discussed by Hahn [7] , while the stability of the process has been proved under rather severe conditions such as the gross substitutability assumption.
In this paper we are concerned with precisely formulating Edgeworth's barter process in a more general model of exchange. Edgeworth's barter process consists of successive barters between individuals according to their preferences and budgetary restraints. At each stage of the barter process, each individual transacts whenever he becomes better off by trading; and, in the competitive case, the quantity of a commodity in exchange for the unit quantity of a standard commodity rises or falls according to whether or not the aggregate demand for that commodity exceeds the aggregate supply. In the present article, we show in particular that Edgeworth's barter process is always globally stable, provided the process has a positive solution starting with an arbitrary positive initial distribution.
TRANSACTION RULES
We consider a model of exchange in which S individuals, labeled s = 1, * * *, S, exchange n + 1 commodities, labeled i = 0, 1, ... , n. Commodity bundles will be represented by vectors with n + 1 components, and superscripts to vectors will refer to individuals. We may without loss of generality assume that all commodity bundles are represented by nonnegative vectors.7 In order to describe the path of bartering, we have to specify the rule by which the transaction between individuals takes place at each time. Such a rule will be referred to as the transaction rutle.
Let y8 be the commodity bundle initially held by individual s, s = 1, * ., S, and p a price vector prevailing in the economy during this period of the transaction.
We denote Y= (y1, * ., yS) and call it the initial distribution. (10) It is assumed that a uniform price vector prevails in the whole economy at each barter and that it varies from one barter to another. Edgeworth's process may be formulated by the following system of difference equations: 
Relation (17) holds with strict inequality unless Y(t + 1) = Y(t)
In fact, suppose that relation (17) holds with equality. Then from (13) and (15), u8[y8(t + 1)] = u[y"(t)], for all s .
Since y8(t + 1) = g8[p(t), Y(t)], we have by Condition (IV)
y8(t + 1) = 88(t) , for all s .
We now show that Y(t) converges to a Pareto-optimum. Let Y* be any limiting distribution of Y(t) as t tends to infinity; i.e., for some sequence {t,}, t, -oo (> oo), 
Since p(t) is bounded, we may, without loss of generality, assume that p(tQ) also converges, say to p*, (19) p* = lim p(t) .

From (14) and (18) we have
Let [p*(t), Y*(t)] be the solution to the process (E) with initial position (p, Y*). By uniqueness and continuity with respect to the initial position of the solution to the process (E), we have by (18) and (19) Y'* (t) = Ys[t; p* Y*] = lim y8[t; p(QY) Y(t-M) = limys(t + t), -,S . V--00
Hence, from (14), 
us[ys(t)] = lim uS[yS(t + tv
utility level US(t) = us(ys(t)) does not decrease as t increases. (IV') The rate of increase in each individual's utility is zero if and only if the distribution Y(t) is the only distribution W(t)=
(wl(t), * * *, ws(t)) which satisfies the following conditions:
Budgetary restraints: p(t)wS(t) p(t)8S(t), for all s,
Iss
Resource restraints: E ws(t) = E yS(t) Preference restraints: us(w8(t)) _ u(tO(t)) , for all s (V') The rate of change in the price vector p(t) depends continuously on the current excess demand Es=> xs(t) -1>= ys(t), where xS(t) is the optimum commodity bundle associated with (p(t), ys(t)).
Furthermore, p(t)= 0 if and only if the current excess demand vanishes. Such a barter process, e.g., may be generated by the following system of differential equations: Since, for each s, us[ys(t)] is nondecreasing with respect to t, the limit exists and is uniquely determined. By applying Lemma 1, therefore, the limiting distribution Y* is uniquely determined. Any limiting point p** of p*(t), as t tends to infinity, is an equilibrium price vector corresponding to Y*. Since pm is a limiting point of p(t) itself, the existence of a subsequence of p(t) converging to an equilibrium price vector has been established.
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